It is hypothesized that there is a pervasive and fundamental bias in humans' understanding of physical causation: Once the roles of cause and effect are assigned to objects in interactions, people tend to overestimate the strength and importance of the causal object and underestimate that of the effect object in bringing about the outcome. This bias is termed the causal asymmetry. Evidence for this bias is reviewed in several domains, including visual impressions of causal relations, reasoning about Newton's third law in naive physics problems, concepts underlying linguistic expressions of causality, and research in causal judgment from contingency information. Although there might be an equivalent to the causal asymmetry in the domain of social causality, there are too many uncertainties in the evidence for conclusions to be drawn.
The first quotation describes a basic law of mechanics, Newton's third law, part of a theory that has been supported by centuries of experiment and observation. Yet it does not correspond to the way humans perceive and judge causes and effects. My aim in this theoretical note is to argue that we have a pervasive bias in our understanding of physical causality that I shall call the causal asymmetry: We tend to see the forces exerted by bodies on each other as unequal. Specifically, having identified one object as the cause object (i.e., that in which the cause is located) and another as the effect object, we tend to see the force exerted by the cause object as greater than that exerted by the effect object or even to neglect the latter altogether. In support of the claim that this is a general feature of our causal understanding, I review evidence from several research domains, including phenomenal causality, naive physics, force dynamics, and causal judgment from contingency information.
Two kinds of causal asymmetry can be identified, because of the fact that two-body interactions result in changes in state for both bodies. Once we have identified one object as the cause object and the other as the effect object, therefore, Version 1 of the causal asymmetry involves overestimation of the importance of the cause object and underestimation or neglect of the importance of the effect object in bringing about the change in state of the effect object. Version 2 involves underestimation or neglect of the force exerted on the cause object by the effect object. In other words, once we have identified one object as the cause object and the other as the effect object, we may overlook effects of the latter on the former.
The definition of the causal asymmetry begs a question, in fact one of the most fundamental questions in the field of causal cognition. When two objects interact, how do we identify one as the cause object and the other as the effect object? Newtonian mechanics shows that this is more of a problem than it might appear. If the force exerted by Body A on Body B is equal to the force exerted by Body B on Body A, what grounds could we have for saying that one body is the cause and the other is the effect? One possible answer is that we identify the effect object in a way that depends on the relative magnitudes of the changes in state. Although the two bodies exert equal forces on each other, collisions tend to involve transfer of momentum. The combined momentum of the two bodies is the same before and after the collision, but it is distributed differently. Furthermore, the objects may deform to different degrees, a factor that is accommodated in the laws of mechanics in a term called the coefficient of restitution. Thus, for example, when a bottle is dropped on a rock and shatters, the force exerted on the bottle by the rock equals that exerted on the rock by the bottle. But we observe a great change in state for the bottle and little or none for the rock because of these considerations of transfer of momentum and object deformation.
When a bottle is dropped on a rock and smashes, we would normally identify the rock as the cause object and the bottle as the effect object. In this case there is a potential circularity in connec-tion with the causal asymmetry. The relative degrees of force exerted may be inferred from the apparent magnitudes of the changes in state. We may judge that the rock exerted great force on the bottle and the bottle exerted little force on the rock because the apparent magnitude of the change in state was great for the bottle and little for the rock. It would be circular to say that the causal asymmetry involves the cause being perceived as stronger than the effect if differences in perceived strength are used to identify the cause object and the effect object in the first place. Furthermore, it would hardly be fair to describe the causal asymmetry as a bias in such a case: Although the forces exerted on each object by the other are equal, the difference in the magnitudes of the effects legitimately reflects differences in the distribution of momentum between the objects, as well as their deformability. It could then be argued that the causal asymmetry, as a phenomenon of causal understanding, corresponds to objective differences in the magnitudes of the changes in state resulting from changes in the distribution of momentum and the deformation of the objects.
To support a claim that the causal asymmetry is a bias in causal understanding, it is therefore necessary to show that it occurs in cases where the cause object and the effect object are identified in some way not involving differences in the apparent magnitudes of the changes in state. How this may be done is an issue that goes far beyond the scope of this theoretical note and has, moreover, been little researched. However, I propose two criteria for the identification of the cause object and the effect object, and I show that the causal asymmetry occurs in cases where the objects are identified in accordance with one or the other of these criteria.
Take the example of a car crash. Car B is stationary and Car A is moving, and Car A runs into Car B. In this case one would normally say that Car A was the cause of the crash. Car A is identified as the cause object because it is active, whereas Car B is passive, stationary. Contrast this example with a case in which both cars are moving. In this case it is no longer immediately clear which is the cause and which is the effect because both objects are active prior to contact. Therefore, as an initial criterion, we can say that when one object is in motion and another object is stationary prior to the occurrence of the causal relation in question, the active object tends to be identified as the cause object, and the passive object tends to be identified as the effect object. I call this the activity criterion.
There is a case, however, in which the cause object and the effect object may be identified when both objects were in motion prior to collision. Suppose that two cars are moving on trajectories that would not bring them into contact. Then Car A changes direction in such a way as to bring it into contact with Car B. In this case we would be likely to say that Car A (or its driver) was the cause. It is not necessary that the causal object be animate. Suppose that a golfer strikes a golf ball and that at the same time a squirrel is running across the golf course at, let us say, the same speed as the ball. The ball strikes a tree, the ball changes direction, and the ball and squirrel collide. In this case we would be likely to identify the ball as the cause object ( e.g., when choosing between the ball and the squirrel; the tree and the golfer may be identified as causal as well, but they are antecedents to the interaction in question).
Active and passive are therefore relative terms. Ideally, passive motion would be identified by Newtonian criteria; that is, it would be inertial motion. A case of this sort is considered later (diSessa, 1982) . However, because this ideal is never realized at the surface of the Earth and because change in kinematic properties must be perceptible in order to count as change for psychological purposes, I propose instead that when both objects are in motion, an object is identified as passive if it shows no perceptible change in kinematic properties other than familiar effects of gravity, friction, and air resistance. Active motion involves a perceived change in kinematic properties other than effects of gravity and so forth. This gives three degrees of activity: active motion, passive motion, and no motion. When two objects have different degrees of activity, the cause object is identified as the one with the higher degree of activity. When both objects have the same degree of activity, then activity cannot be used as a criterion to identify the cause and effect objects unless research reveals further degrees of differentiation of activity. The three degrees outlined here suffice for the purpose of argument about the causal asymmetry.
One problem with the car crash example is that we would not normally say that the effect was something happening to Car B. We would say that the effect was the crash or collision. This is something that implicitly refers to both cars. There are in fact many effects that could be identified: a crumpled fender on one car, a broken windshield on the other, a gash on the face of the driver, and so on. We might legitimately want to explain any of these. What we identify as the effect, therefore, is not merely a matter of kinematics. It is also a matter of interest. We identify the effect, in other words, in part on the basis of our practical concerns (White, 1984) . It follows that what we identify as the cause will vary depending on what effect we are trying to explain. Thus, a paramedic tending the injured driver would be concerned with the driver's injury and might identify as the cause the fact that the driver was not wearing a seat belt, so that his or her head was thrown onto the dashboard. A mechanic examining the cars would be concerned with the fact that Car A ran into Car B and might identify as the cause the fact that the brakes of Car A failed. This shows that cause and effect objects are identified in accordance with the practical concerns of the individuals involved.
Initially, then, the objects in an interaction are identified as the cause object and the effect object. The factors that determine these identifications include the activity criterion (with the active object being favored as the cause and the passive object as the effect), practical concerns, and the relative apparent magnitudes of the changes in state (with the object undergoing the greater apparent change being favored as the effect). The causal asymmetry is not directly caused by these identifications but is a consequence of the way in which we perceive and interpret interactions in the light of them. The causal asymmetry cannot be conclusively identified as a bias in cases where the identification of cause and effect objects is determined by the apparent magnitudes of the changes in state, but it can be identified as such in cases where the identification of cause and effect objects is determined by the other two criteria. There may be additional criteria for these identifications. This in itself is an important research topic, because the laws of mechanics imply that there is no objectively correct identification of cause and effect; however, it lies outside the scope of the present theoretical note.
The hypothesis, then, is that the causal asymmetry is a pervasive phenomenon of perception, judgment, and belief about physical causality and that it consists of a tendency to underestimate or neglect the contribution of the effect object's dynamic properties to its own resultant behavior (Version 1) and to underestimate or neglect the force exerted by the effect object on the causal object (Version 2). It is a unitary phenomenon, manifesting itself in similar ways in different domains, as is shown below. The causal asymmetry follows, but is not directly caused by, the identification of the cause object and the effect object.
Physical causality is not limited to interactions between inanimate objects. If it were, the causal asymmetry might be regarded as a curiosity of only occasional significance. But in fact, our experience of physical causality consists primarily in interactions between physical objects and our own bodies. At every moment we are in contact with something in the physical world, whether we are just sitting on a chair, walking across a floor, or manipulating objects in some way, such as pressing keys on a keyboard, pushing, lifting, or carrying objects, wielding a pen, and so on. The laws of mechanics apply to all of these things. There is therefore no waking moment of our lives in which our understanding of physical causality does not have some kind of relevance, and automatic perceptual processing and cognition about causality are going on most of the time, if not all the time. To the extent that the causal asymmetry pervades causal cognition, it may therefore be a widespread and important feature of our understanding of how the world works.
In most of what follows, the causal asymmetry is established as a bias by comparisons with Newtonian analyses of the interactions under consideration. In some cases, however, Newtonian analyses are impractical because of the complexity of the events or a lack of critical information. In these cases, it is still possible to establish that the causal asymmetry occurs if there is a clear objective standard against which to compare causal judgment or perception. In the case of causal judgment from contingency information, for example, I argue that counterfactual analyses can suffice for this purpose.
I now present evidence of the causal asymmetry in several domains of causal cognition: phenomenal causality, naive physics, force dynamics, and contingency judgment. Phenomenal causality is a term used for visual impressions of interactions between objects (Michotte, 1963) . Naive physics refers to reasoning and judgment about physical phenomena by nonexperts (McCloskey, 1983) . Force dynamics concerns the form and semantics of linguistic expressions of causality (Talmy, 1988) . Contingency judgment refers to research on the inference of causal relations from covariation information. In a later section, I consider the possible origin of the causal asymmetry.
Phenomenal Causality
Phenomenal causality is the term used by Michotte (1963) to denote a certain kind of impression that occurs in visual perception, that one object is causing something to happen to another object. The usual example of this is the launching effect, discovered and investigated by Michotte (1963) . In a typical stimulus for the launching effect, there are two objects, opaque rectangles or disks called A and B. B is initially stationary. A moves toward B in a straight line at constant speed and comes into contact with it. At this point, A stops moving and B starts to move in the same direction and at the same or a slightly lesser speed. Observers of this stimulus usually report that they see A make B go by kicking it or bumping into it. In other words, they see B's motion as caused by A, rather than as autonomous. This is the launching effect.
The launching effect has been replicated in many experiments, and much is now known about the conditions under which it does and does not occur (Beasley, 1968; Boyle, 1960 Boyle, , 1975 H. Choi & Scholl, 2004; Costall, 1991; Gordon, Day, & Stecher, 1990; Guski & Troje, 2003; Leslie, 1982 Leslie, , 1984 Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Michotte & Thinès, 1991; Natsoulas, 1961; Powesland, 1959; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002 Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; White, 1988 White, , 1995 Yela, 1952) . Although there have been reports that some naive observers, perhaps as many as 50%, do not report the launching effect when perceiving the typical stimulus (Beasley, 1968; Boyle, 1960; Gemelli & Cappellini, 1958) , subsequent studies with improved methodology have found much higher rates of reporting the launching effect (Gordon et al., 1990; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) .
The typical stimulus is deliberately highly abstracted: The objects are simple two-dimensional geometrical forms, and nothing else is visible, no context nor any surface on which the objects might move. Most important, there is no actual causality in the stimulus: It is just an animation, generated by a mechanical apparatus (Michotte, 1963) or a computer (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002) , and the causal impression is an illusion, a construction of the perceptual processes. The launching effect is a visual impression: It has the appearance of immediacy, it is automatic and not subject to voluntary control, and it lacks the subjective characteristics of an inference or higher order cognitive process (Blakemore et al., 2001; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) .
Both versions of the causal asymmetry are manifest in the launching effect. The motion of Object B is seen as caused only by Object A. This is the point of the quotation from Runeson (1983) at the start of this theoretical note. The motion of Object B after collision is properly described as a function of the dynamic properties of both objects: The mass of Object B, for example, is just as much involved as the mass of Object A. Yet this does not correspond to the perceptual impression: The contribution of Object B's dynamical properties to its resultant motion is not perceived. This is Version 1 of the causal asymmetry.
In addition, only the motion of Object B is seen as caused. In the whole history of research on the launching effect, nobody has reported an impression that Object B makes Object A stop moving. If this were a real interaction between objects, the force exerted by B on A would be equal to that exerted by A on B. It would be just as true to say that B stops A from moving as it would be to say that A makes B move. But only the latter is perceived. This is Version 2 of the causal asymmetry.
Some studies of the launching effect have asked participants to rate the strength of their causal impression, in other words the strength of the impression that A made B move (e.g., Natsoulas, 1961) . In these studies it was implicitly assumed that participants would perceive A as the cause object and B as the effect object; the converse possibility was not even presented as a response option. However, other studies merely asked observers to report what they perceived (Gordon et al., 1990; Michotte, 1963) . In these studies, the open-ended question allowed participants to report any kind of impression. In both types of studies, the typical launching effect stimulus invariably gave rise to reports that A was seen as causing B's motion; no causal contribution of B to its own motion was ever reported, nor was there any report that B was seen as stopping A. These studies give the most unequivocal evidence for the causal asymmetry.
1
It would be going too far to say that we cannot perceive B as causing A to stop. Certainly we can have the thought that B caused A to stop, and it is possible that such thoughts are enabled by experiences of perceiving one object causing another one to stop moving. However, the opposite direction of influence is also possible. Once we have the idea of causality and some acquired causal beliefs, we have the conceptual equipment to enable us to infer that one object stopped another one from moving. It is certainly possible to observe a typical launching effect stimulus and interpret it as B causing A to stop. The research evidence indicates, however, that this is not what is perceived by naive observers and that, when it occurs, the idea that B caused A to stop is a meaning attributed to the stimulus in some postperceptual higher level cognitive activity. There are circumstances under which people can note a contingency between one event and another and judge that the first event might have caused the second, but these inferences are independent of the perceptual impression in the launching effect (Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992) . The launching effect therefore represents a fairly pure case of the causal asymmetry.
Could this be a case of the potential circularity in identification of the cause object and the effect object? Could it be the case, in other words, that the apparent magnitude of the change in state is greater for B than for A, that because of this A is seen as stronger than B, and in consequence B is identified as the effect object and A as the cause object? If this were the case, then the causal asymmetry, the perception that the cause object exerts more force than the effect object, would be true only by circular reasoning.
In fact there is no circularity here. The launching effect is strongest when B moves at a slower speed than A had been moving at and does not occur if B moves faster than A (Michotte, 1963; Natsoulas, 1961) . Michotte (1963) reported that the launching effect occurred when B moved at one quarter of A's speed. When B moves more slowly than A, this entails that the change in state is greater for A than for B: A changes from, let us say, 32 cm/s to rest, whereas B changes from rest to, let us say, 16 cm/s or at any rate, a speed slower than that of A. So if the magnitude of the change in state determined the identification of the cause object and the effect object, in this case B should be seen as the cause object and A as the effect object, the opposite of what is perceived. By contrast, when B moves off at a faster rate than A, the change in state is greater for B than for A. In this case, if the magnitude of the change in state determined the identification of the cause object and the effect object, A should be seen as the cause object and B as the effect object. But in fact, under these conditions of relative speed, the launching effect does not occur, and B is seen as moving of its own accord (Michotte, 1963; Natsoulas, 1961) .
It is arguable that in the launching effect, the cause object and the effect object are identified by the activity criterion. Prior to contact, A is active and B is passive in the sense of being stationary. The order of events is therefore as follows: perception of A as active and B as passive (prior to contact); identification of A as the cause object and B as the effect object; and occurrence of a causal impression featuring the causal asymmetry. The launching effect, the perceptual impression of causality, occurs not at the instant of contact but shortly thereafter: Some postcontact motion is necessary for the causal impression to occur (Michotte, 1963) . This leaves two possibilities. One is that the cause object and the effect object are identified prior to contact in accordance with the activity criterion, and the other is that they are identified at or shortly after contact but before the occurrence of the causal impression. The causal asymmetry is a feature of the causal impression, so either of these two possibilities is consistent with the hypothesis that identification of the cause object and the effect object precedes the causal asymmetry.
The role of the activity criterion in the causal asymmetry in this case is confirmed by a different visual causal impression, that of pulling (White & Milne, 1997) . In a typical stimulus that conveys the impression of pulling, there are five stationary rectangles arranged in a column with gaps between them. After a short pause, the top object moves off horizontally at a constant speed. After a further short pause, the next object moves off in the same direction and at the same speed, and so on, until all of the objects are in motion. White and Milne (1997) found that 100% of participants reported the pulling impression when observing the typical stimulus.
The stimulus for the pulling impression differs from that for the launching effect in almost every respect. The causal object never approaches the effect objects and is never in contact with them. In terms of direction of motion it is ahead of them, not behind. These characteristics, therefore, cannot be instrumental in the identification of the cause object and the effect object. The one thing that the launching effect and the pulling impression have in common is that the object that moves first is perceptually identified as the cause object. Activity versus passivity, therefore, is the criterion.
The causal asymmetry is also manifest in the pulling impression. The causal object is seen as exerting force on the other objects, which are pulled by it, but the effect objects are not seen as exerting force on the causal object (Version 2). Furthermore, the motion of the effect objects is seen as caused entirely by the causal object, and there is, perceptually, no contribution from the effect objects themselves (Version 1). This is also the case for other kinds of visual causal impression. White and Milne (1999) reported two kinds of visual causal impression, called enforced disintegration and bursting. In both of these, a moving object contacts a stationary one, which then comes apart in pieces, with the pieces moving off in various directions. The impressions occur under different conditions: When the pieces move more slowly than the causal object, people perceive the causal object as smashing the stationary object to pieces (enforced disintegration), and when the pieces move more rapidly than the causal object, people perceive the causal object as triggering a release of energy from the stationary object (bursting). In both cases, however, the impression is purely one of the causal object exerting force on the effect object. There is no impression of the effect object exerting force on the causal object and thus causing a change in its state of motion (Version 2), and in the case of enforced disintegration, there is no impression of the effect object's properties contributing to its resultant motion (Version 1). These impressions are highly consensual. White and Milne (1999) used a 101-point rating scale, and the typical stimulus for the enforced disintegration impression in Experiment 1 yielded a mean rating of 86, with a majority of participants giving the maximum rating of 100 and only 3 participants (out of 39) rating it less than 50.
The identification of the cause object and the effect object is not determined by the activity criterion in all cases. In Michotte's (1963) Experiment 26 on the launching effect, the two objects initially moved toward each other at the same speed, and on contact, Object A stopped moving and Object B returned in the direction from which it came. Michotte reported that 7 observers of this stimulus all received an immediate impression of launching: That is, they perceived A as the cause of B's motion. This seems like a case of the causal asymmetry, because they apparently did not perceive B as the cause of A's stopping, nor did they perceive B as contributing to its own postcollision motion. However, the cause object and the effect object could not have been identified by the activity criterion in this case because both objects were similarly active prior to contact. It is possible that the difference in the magnitudes of the changes in state is the determining factor in this case, because B's reversal of direction of motion is a greater change in state than is A's halting. This result might be a case of the causal asymmetry, and if all instances of the launching effect are explained in the same way, then it probably is. We cannot be certain, however, because there is no unequivocal bias toward identifying the object that underwent the greater change in state of motion as the effect object.
The quotation from Runeson (1983) at the start of this theoretical note formed part of a critique of Michotte's (1963) research on phenomenal causality. Runeson pointed out several respects in which Michotte's analysis of phenomenal causality was at variance with the laws of mechanics and said that Michotte's work suffered from a "causality obsession" (Runeson, 1983, p. 33) . Subsequent research has confirmed that people can estimate dynamical properties such as relative mass accurately from visual displays of interactions between objects (Runeson & Frykholm, 1981; Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000; Runeson & Vedeler, 1993) . But these estimations of dynamical properties are independent of the visual causal impressions. This is shown most clearly in the pulling impression. Dynamical properties such as relative mass cannot be inferred when the objects in question do not come into contact (Runeson, 1983) . In the typical pulling impression stimulus, the objects never come into contact, and yet a qualitatively specific impression of causality still occurs (White & Milne, 1997) . People may be able to judge dynamical properties accurately, but they still have illusory and inaccurate impressions of causality that exhibit the causal asymmetry and in so doing fail to conform to the laws of mechanics.
Naive Physics
Naive physics is the study of the judgments and beliefs about physical phenomena held by laypeople, both adults and children. It has become a commonplace of naive physics research that children and adults make erroneous judgments about the behavior of objects in physical systems and appear to possess inaccurate beliefs and theories about mechanics. A wide range of such phenomena has been documented (Clement, 1982; Hegarty, 2004; Kaiser, Jonides, & Alexander, 1986; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; Krist, 2000; McCloskey, 1983; McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980) . My concern here is specifically with Newton's third law of motion, because this is the case where there is a clear standard against which evidence relevant to the causal asymmetry can be assessed. The research that provides that evidence was predominantly conducted by diSessa (1982, 1983, 1993) .
According to diSessa (1993), people tend to reason about physical phenomena with the aid of phenomenological primitives, or p-prims, which he defined as "rather small knowledge structures, typically involving configurations of only a few parts, that act largely by being recognized in a physical system or in the system's behavior or hypothesized behavior" (p. 111). There are many of these, but the one that is of greatest relevance to the present account is Ohm's p-prim. According to diSessa (1993, p. 126), Ohm's p-prim is an organized set of four components: "an agent that is the locus of an impetus that acts against a resistance to produce some sort of result." The locus of the resistance and the result is a patient, on which the agent acts. Ohm's p-prim is used to interpret and make judgments about numerous physical phenomena. Among the examples discussed by diSessa (1983) are not only "pushing harder in order to make objects move faster" (p. 25) but also predicting the change in pitch of sound produced by a vacuum cleaner when the nozzle is obstructed, current flow in an electrical circuit, and social causality, including trying harder and influencing and "modeling interpersonal relations such as a parent's offering more and more encouragement to counter a child's offering increasing resistance" (p. 25).
Ohm's p-prim is the naive equivalent of Newton's third law: Instead of equal and opposite forces, it postulates agents acting on patients. It is applied by naive judges in situations where Newton's third law would be appropriate. Ohm's p-prim encapsulates an asymmetry in the naive understanding of mechanics in the form of a distinction between agent and patient. DiSessa (1993) commented that the notions of agent, effort, and patient seem to lie at the root of intuitive physics, and he discussed numerous illustrations of them. There is therefore in Ohm's p-prim a demarcation of the roles of the cause object and the effect object, marked by the terms agent and patient, respectively.
This asymmetry in the conceptualization of objects involved in interactions sets the ground for the causal asymmetry. The agent is seen as the cause, and the patient as the locus of the effect, and the result occurs because the resistance offered by the patient is typically insufficient with respect to the impetus provided by the agent. That is, the agent is stronger than the patient and predominantly or even entirely determines the result (Version 1 of the causal asymmetry). Moreover, the effect of the patient on the agent is neglected (Version 2).
Just such an asymmetry can be found in several cases discussed by diSessa. The most striking of these is documented in diSessa's 1982 study. In this study, participants interacted with a computergenerated object that moved in accordance with Newtonian laws. In the absence of force applied to it, the object moved in a straight line at a constant speed. Participants attempted to control the motion of the object by applying simulated pushes to it. DiSessa found that both adults and children almost always expected that the object would move in precisely the direction in which it was pushed. In fact, the resultant direction of motion is a function of the direction of the push and the direction of the object's motion: The push deflects the object, rather than fully determining its path. Participants' expectations therefore exhibited neglect of the role played by the object's momentum. In this case, the push is the cause, and the resultant motion of the object is the effect. In accordance with Ohm's p-prim, the push is understood as an agent acting on a patient to produce a result, a new direction of motion. But people incorrectly judge that the cause, the push, is the sole determinant of the resultant direction, and that the effect object does not contribute to this at all. This is Version 1 of the causal asymmetry.
People's naive understanding of pushing in general reflects the causal asymmetry. The pushing object (such as a person using his or her hand) is in the role of the agent, and the object being pushed is in the role of the patient and is understood as passive (diSessa, 1993, p. 132) . The effect object resists, but the force of the push is seen as stronger than the force of the resistance because the push overcomes the object's resistance and the object moves. The idea that the objects exert equal and opposite forces on each other is counterintuitive in this situation.
In physics education, this naive level of understanding is only gradually replaced. The form of Newton's third law that is most familiar to nonprofessionals is this one: "For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction" (diSessa, 1993, p. 152) . But this is not an accurate statement of the law (compare it with the version quoted at the beginning of this theoretical note). Action and reaction do not constitute a symmetrical arrangement. In fact, they preserve the agent-patient relation that lies at the heart of the intuitive understanding of mechanics. Agents dominate: They are the causes, they principally determine what happens. Reactions are less salient and are not well understood, even by physics undergraduates (diSessa, 1993) . The concept of reaction even implies the notion of delay for many people: diSessa (1993) reported that some students claim that one can tell which is the action and which is the reaction from which acts first. This is an important observation because it indicates that, as in the case of phenomenal causality, the cause object and the effect object (or the agent and the patient, the action and the reaction) are on some occasions identified in accordance with the activity criterion, not in accordance with apparent differences in the magnitudes of the changes in state. In Newtonian mechanics, neither of the interacting objects is the instigating agent.
The interpretation of Newton's third law in terms of action and reaction leads to several errors of interpretation. One is underestimation of the reaction. For example, when someone uses his or her hand to push a cup on a table, people tend to underestimate the force exerted by the cup on the hand, compared with that exerted by the hand on the cup. This is Version 2 of the causal asymmetry. Also, the reaction may be incorrectly identified. If the push is continuous, it is in effect acting against the friction with the table that slows the motion of the cup, and the resistive force of friction may then be incorrectly identified as the reaction. A further error is the refusal to accept that a passive object is exerting any force at all. Children tend to deny that a wall pushes back when they push against it, "even if they see a protuberance from the wall deforming a piece of clay held in the hand" (diSessa, 1993, p. 154 ). When we consider a cup sitting on a table, it is also counterintuitive to understand the table as pushing the cup: "Not moving is not a prototypical result of a push" (diSessa, 1993, p. 153) . People tend to deny that a passive object exerts any force even when the effects of the force are evident, as in the case in which an actor breaks his or her hand against a wall (Clement, 1987) . These examples also illustrate Version 2 of the causal asymmetry.
The causal asymmetry at the heart of the naive understanding of mechanics is evident in these illustrations. Here it appears as a feature of reasoning. In the previous section, it appeared as a feature of perception. Michotte (1963) presented a stimulus similar to the launching effect stimulus except that, after contact, A and B moved off together, remaining in contact. This phase of motion could quite easily be understood as two objects moving independently, or even as Object B pulling Object A, but in fact observers reliably reported an impression that A was pushing B. As with the launching effect, there was no impression that B was exerting any force on A (Version 2) or that B was contributing to the causation of its own motion (Version 1). The causal asymmetry that is a feature of the visual impression in this form of phenomenal causality is the same as the causal asymmetry in our judgment of what is going on when we consider a hand pushing a mug across a table. The same kind of erroneous understanding features in both perception and conception. This makes it likely that the causal asymmetry is the same phenomenon in both domains.
Force Dynamics
Force dynamics is a term used for the expression of causal concepts in language. Force dynamics was systematically analyzed by Talmy (1988) , who brought together a number of concepts related to causality into a single organized set. Talmy's system has been to some extent modified by subsequent researchers (Jackendoff, 1990; Wolff & Song, 2003) . However, Talmy's analysis elucidates the causal asymmetry in a relatively clear manner, and Talmy himself noted the asymmetry in the context of force dynamics, so I shall concentrate on his account here. Talmy (1988) outlined some basic force-dynamic distinctions, beginning with what he called steady-state force-dynamic patterns. In this case, language marks a role distinction between two entities exerting forces, and Talmy used the terms agonist and antagonist to label the roles. Talmy stated that as language treats the concept, an entity is taken to exert a force by virtue of having an intrinsic tendency toward manifesting it. This tendency can be toward motion or toward rest. Thus, there are four force-dynamic patterns organized in two conceptual dimensions according to whether the tendency of the agonist is toward motion or toward rest and whether the opposing tendency of the antagonist is or is not stronger. "According to their relative strengths, the opposing force entities yield a resultant, an event occurrence" (Talmy, 1988, p. 54) .
Two of these four force-dynamic patterns are expressed with the term because of, and the other two are expressed with the term despite. The former two are of interest here. In one, "an Agonist with an intrinsic tendency toward rest . . . is being opposed from outside by a stronger Antagonist, which thus overcomes its resistance and forces it to move" (Talmy, 1988, p. 54 ). An example would be "The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it." In the other pattern, the intrinsic tendency of the agonist is toward motion, but the opposing antagonist is stronger and keeps it in place. An example would be "The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there."
The second set of basic force-dynamic distinctions is shifting force-dynamic patterns. These are descriptions of changes through time. For example, an antagonist, instead of impinging steadily on an agonist, enters or leaves a state of impingement. Talmy (1988) distinguished four cases in which the antagonist is stronger. Two of these, involving the antagonist entering a state of impingement, are expressed by a causal verb such as made, and the other two, involving the antagonist leaving a state of impingement, are expressed by words such as let. The former two are of interest here. In one of these, the antagonist changes the agonist's state from rest to motion, as in, for example, "The ball's hitting it made the lamp topple from the table." Talmy noted that this is the prototypical form of the linguistic category of causative, the one most usually associated with the notion of causation. In the other, the antagonist changes the agonist's state from motion to rest, as in, for example, "The water's dripping on it made the fire die down." Subsequent modifications to force dynamics by other authors have not significantly affected the part of the analysis presented here. For example, whereas Talmy (1988) was mainly concerned with relations between causing and other concepts such as letting and hindering, Wolff and Song (2003) were concerned with the relations among causing, enabling, and preventing. Wolff and Song preferred the terms affector and patient to antagonist and agonist, respectively. Whereas Talmy's analysis involved several dimensions, that of Wolff and Song (2003) involved just three: "(1) the tendency of the patient for a result, (2) the presence of opposition between the affector and patient, and (3) the occurrence of a result" (p. 283). In the example "The blast caused the boat to heel," the tendency of the patient (the boat) is not to heel, the tendency is opposed by the affector (the blast), and the result of heeling occurs. The observations made by Talmy in relation to the causal asymmetry are not invalidated by any of the modifications proposed by Wolff and Song. Talmy (1988) noted that the four categories I have described in detail here constitute the general causative category, and they have in common that the agonist's resultant is the opposite of its intrinsic actional tendency. Language differentiates roles in causal interactions: "The 'Agonist' concept confers on one object in an interaction a privileged status and special characteristics not shared by its opposite, the 'Antagonist,' even when these two are otherwise equivalent" (Talmy, 1988, p. 91) . Talmy commented that no such privilege exists in physical theory.
However, the causal asymmetry as I have defined it is not the mere role differentiation between agonist and antagonist, or patient and affector, or patient and agent, but a general tendency to see the cause of the result as having the greater strength. This notion of greater strength is overt in all four of the causal categories identified by Talmy (1988, p. 92) : "In one application of the conception, a stronger Antagonist is required so as to be able to block an Agonist with tendency toward motion and to hold it stationary in place." This refers to the second of the four categories, exemplified by the log not rolling down an incline because of a ridge. The same relation of strength is evident in all four categories. Talmy pointed out not only how natural this conception is but also that it is at variance with Newton's third law. In the example, the force exerted on the ridge by the log is equal to that exerted on the log by the ridge. However, it is evident from Talmy's analysis that linguistic expressions of causality characteristically represent not just an asymmetrical role differentiation but also an asymmetry in attributed strength, such that the result is determined by whichever entity is the stronger. This is Version 1 of the causal asymmetry. Wolff and Song (2003) argued that the launching effect could be explained in terms of force dynamics. They argued that what leads people to perceive the launching effect is "their perception of the patient's [Object B] tendency to not move, an affector [Object A] that opposes the patient's tendency, and the occurrence of a result" (p. 316). But according to force dynamics, we could just as well perceive Object B as causing Object A to stop moving: We could perceive the patient's (Object A in this case) tendency to move, an affector (Object B) that opposes the patient's tendency, and the occurrence of a result, that Object A stops moving. Both of these are equally legitimate constructions in force dynamics. Force dynamics therefore does not explain why we perceive the launching effect as we do, in other words, as A making B move and not as B stopping A from moving. Arguably the analysis of the launching effect by Wolff and Song (2003) itself exhibits Version 2 of the causal asymmetry by not recognizing the latter possibility. In this case, therefore, it is more likely that the causal concepts and their expression in language are explained by the causal impression in the launching effect than the other way round.
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Elsewhere in their article Wolff and Song (2003) recognized a bias in language that may owe something to the causal asymmetry. They noted that it is more natural to use cause than prevent to describe situations in which a result occurs, and vice versa for situations in which a result is stopped from occurring. For exam-2 This is not to argue that linguistic expressions of causality are determined solely by perceptual impressions: There can be other determinants of linguistic expressions, and indeed influence of language on perception is also possible. We can say, and understand, expressions such as "B caused A to stop moving" even though a perceptual impression of B stopping A from moving forms no part of the launching effect. This may indicate that linguistic expressions are not wholly explained by perceptual impressions. It is not proof, however. There are circumstances, when a moving object (A) collides with a stationary one (B), in which we may perceive B as causing A to stop moving. An example might be a lump of custard landing on a kitchen floor. Here we could say that the floor caused the lump of custard to stop moving, but it is noticeably odd to use the word cause when the grammatical subject of the verb does not actually do anything. It is more natural to say that the lump of custard stopped moving because it hit the floor, as if the custard was the cause of its own halting. To my knowledge there has been no research on how people perceive such events. If people do perceive B as causing A to stop moving in such a case, it would not be possible to say whether it was a case of the causal asymmetry or not, because obviously the greater change of state would occur for the object that is assigned the role of effect, namely A. ple, it is more natural to say "High winds caused the trees to fall" than "High winds prevented the trees from remaining standing" (Wolff & Song, 2003, p. 321 ). Wolff and Song noted that the force dynamic model as it is does not explain this bias. The bias resembles some of the examples discussed by diSessa (1993), such as that it is not natural to think of a table as exerting force on a cup that is resting on it. We might say that the table prevented the cup from falling to the floor, but not that the table caused the cup to remain where it was. We do not find it natural, therefore, to think of causes in relation to things being made to remain as they are. This may be a further indication that our understanding of causality originates with experiences of dynamic events involving changes of state, and in particular with the fact that our perception of dynamic events does not accord with Newton's third law. To that extent, then, the bias in the use of the word cause may owe something to the causal asymmetry.
To summarize, linguistic expressions of causal concepts are not Newtonian, but instead consistently reflect a role differentiation that, when the resultant opposes the natural tendency of the patient, corresponds to the roles of cause and effect; and, in overcoming the natural tendency of the patient, the cause is implicitly or explicitly the stronger of the two. The lesson from force dynamics is therefore that the causal asymmetry pervades the causal concepts that are expressed in language.
Causal Judgment From Contingency Information
Contingency information is conventionally defined as information about occurrences and nonoccurrences of a given kind of effect and the presence and absence of possible causes of that effect. When just one possible cause is under consideration, there are four possible combinations: occurrences of the effect in the presence of the cause, nonoccurrences of the effect in the presence of the cause, occurrences of the effect when the cause is absent, and nonoccurrences of the effect when the cause is absent. In the study of causal judgment from contingency information, researchers are seeking the kind of model that best predicts observed tendencies in the judgments people make about information in this form.
In this area, the causal asymmetry manifests itself not in participants' judgments but in the methods used by the researchers. Studies of causal judgment from contingency information set up a kind of scenario and present contingency information within the context of that scenario. A typical example is the allergic reaction scenario. Participants are told that medical researchers are trying to assess the extent to which a particular substance causes allergic reactions in people who consume it. Participants are then presented with a series of cases, in each of which the substance is or is not consumed by a person who then either has or does not have an allergic reaction. This exemplifies a clear role differentiation: The substance is the cause object, and the patient is the effect object. The causal asymmetry (Version 1) is shown by the fact that the causal contribution of the patient to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the allergic reaction is neglected. Participants are never asked to judge the contribution of the effect object, the patient in this example, to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the allergic reaction.
Here are some examples. Anderson and Sheu (1995) asked participants to judge the extent to which a drug caused side effects in patients. Collins and Shanks (2002) asked participants to judge the extent to which radiation caused mutations in different butterfly species. Dennis and Ahn (2001) asked participants to judge the extent to which a kind of plant ingested by a patient caused a kind of physical reaction. Kao and Wasserman (1993) had participants judge the extent to which a fertilizer promoted blooming in a kind of plant. And Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, and Baker (1993) asked participants to judge the extent to which tapping a key affected the occurrence of a white light. These examples are typical of those that have been used in this research area. The only exceptions are studies in which predictive rather than causal judgments were requested: For example, Catena, Maldonado, and Cándido (1998) asked participants to judge to what extent a given symptom predicted a particular disease in a patient.
In situations such as these, Newtonian analyses are hardly practical because the scenarios describe what would actually be a complex set of individual events and because many of those events are unobservable. Nevertheless, the occurrence of the causal asymmetry can be established if there is a clear objective standard against which to compare what people do. In these situations, there is a clear standard in every case, because it is clear in every case that the effect object must be causally involved in the production of the outcome. This can be ascertained by a consideration of counterfactuals. The occurrence of a side effect when a drug is administered to a patient depends in part on the physiology of the patient: An effect object with a different physiology, such as a tree, would not be expected to show the same side effect. The occurrence of blooming obviously involves the natural developmental processes of a plant. A fertilizer might even be properly conceptualized as a facilitator rather than a cause in this case. Applying the fertilizer to a different kind of object, such as a fungus or a fish, would obviously have a different effect (or none at all). Tapping a key might affect the occurrence of a white light, but the light bulb itself must be causally involved in this as well, as would soon be apparent if it was broken. These counterfactuals clearly reveal that the effect object is causally involved.
It is not necessarily an error to ignore the causal contribution of the effect object. Its contribution can be regarded as implicit, a kind of background against which the causal contribution of the cause in question can be assessed. What is striking about this research, however, is that no study has ever asked participants to judge the extent to which an effect object causes an outcome. As the examples show, participants are invariably asked to judge the causal status of an extrinsic cause acting on an effect object. In short, within causal judgment from contingency information, there is an entire field of study-judgments about the causal status of effect objects-that has never been investigated. This is the causal asymmetry: The causal importance of the effect object has been neglected.
This neglect has an obvious importance for models of causal judgment from contingency information. There is currently much controversy over the nature of causal judgment, with several competing models of different kinds (Buehner, Cheng, & Clifford, 2003; Cheng, 1997; De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Perales & Shanks, 2003; Shanks, 1995; . But would the same tendencies emerge in judgments of the causal contribution of effect objects as have been observed in judgments of causal objects? In the allergic reaction scenario, for example, would the models that predict judgments of the causal status of the drug also predict judgments of the causal status of the patient? There are reasons for thinking that they might not (White, 2005) , although research on this topic has yet to be published. If this turns out to be the case, then it would have profound implications for theories of causal judgment.
If the tendency I have identified in the thinking of researchers indicates a general tendency in thinking about causality, then it would show itself not so much in the use of contingency information to judge particular causal candidates but in the selection of plausible candidates about which to make causal judgments. It would be enlightening to ask participants for first guesses as to the most likely explanation for effects of the kinds studied in contingency judgment research, such as the side effect and mutation scenarios, or to ask them to assign weights to the contributions of causal and effect objects in determining the outcome. Under the hypothesis of the causal asymmetry, other things (such as contingencies) being equal, a general tendency to give greater weight to the cause object than to the effect object would be predicted.
The Causal Asymmetry in Social Causality? Both diSessa (1993) and Talmy (1988) drew attention to apparently similar causal reasoning and causal concepts in the physical and social realms. In his discussion of Ohm's p-prim, diSessa (1993) included an example of a parent trying to influence a recalcitrant child, and Talmy's (1988) discussion of force dynamics included an example of a kind of internal conflict within the self. So, is there a causal asymmetry in people's understanding of the social or psychological realm, as there is in their understanding of the physical realm? This is a difficult question to address for many reasons but for one overriding one. Whereas Newtonian mechanics can be applied (in principle) to purely physical interactions such as billiard balls colliding and cars crashing, the application of mechanics in the social and psychological realms must be through metaphor or analogy. This is not to say that behavior cannot be analyzed in mechanical terms. However, mechanics is concerned with motions and specifically with the underlying but purely physical dynamical properties that determine motions. Social behavior, on the other hand, is motion plus meaning. An act of persuasion, for example, certainly involves behaviors that can be analyzed mechanically; but in terms of psychological causation it is the meaning of the behavior that matters, not its purely physical description. The same movement pattern can be construed as a different action under different circumstances (Smith & Jones, 1986) . For example, the same arm-waving movement can be used for either greeting a friend or hailing a taxi. Social influences, therefore, can only be understood by referring to the meanings that behaviors have. It is in this respect that the application of the laws of mechanics to social behavior must be understood as metaphorical or analogical.
An obvious candidate for the causal asymmetry in social causality is achievement-related behavior. Here the Newtonian analogy seems appropriate because it can be understood as a contest between opposing forces, one set within the person (ability, effort, etc.) and one set within the task (difficulty, luck, etc.; Weiner, 1985 Weiner, , 1986 Weiner et al., 1972) . Evidence for the causal asymmetry would be a tendency to attribute greater strength to whichever of these was identified as the cause. People tend to attribute success to actors and failure to task characteristics (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) , and this finding could be interpreted as exemplifying Version 1 of the causal asymmetry, because the actor would be identified as the cause of success and the task as the cause of failure on the grounds that failure opposes the tendency of the actor. This would be a case of the cause object and the effect object being identified in accordance with practical concerns, and the causal asymmetry would then follow from this identification.
In some cases-namely, achievements that can be defined in purely physical terms-such a tendency in causal attribution would indeed fit with the causal asymmetry hypothesis. For example, if the achievement is succeeding or failing at climbing a rope in a gymnasium, the relevant behavior can be described in purely physical terms, and the laws of mechanics apply. Under many circumstances, however, such as taking examinations, success and failure are defined in terms of meanings rather than pure physical occurrences. Wielding a pen can be described in Newtonian terms, but there is no literal Newtonian description of passing or failing an exam. The problem with this case is that it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether there is a bias in people's understanding of the situation. In the case of success, people may attribute greater strength to the actor than to the task, but it is not clear what criterion could be used to judge whether this was right or wrong. People may tend to see causes as stronger than effects in achievement in terms of social causality, but it is not clear that this would be incorrect.
Another candidate for the causal asymmetry might be what is often called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) . This is conventionally described as a tendency to give too much weight to person factors and too little to situation factors in the causation of behavior. It is related to the correspondence bias, which is a tendency to infer personal dispositions that resemble or correspond to observable features of behavior, implying neglect of situational influences on behavior (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) . This certainly sounds like Version 1 of the causal asymmetry: The actor is the immediate cause of his or her own behavior, and then the causal importance of the cause is overestimated.
This case too is problematic, however. As in the case of achievement-related behavior, Newtonian mechanics applies only as a kind of analogy: One has to imagine opposing forces, some in the person and some in the situation, battling it out to determine which has the greater influence on behavior. It is not clear that this analogy holds. The behaviors under consideration here are actions, and actions are usually explained in terms of reasons, not causes (Malle, 1999; Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001a) . From this perspective, situational factors are not properly construed as causes of behavior at all. They can occupy more than one role in the antecedents to action.
Reasons commonly involve reference to beliefs and desires held by the actor. For example, John might say that he jumped into the shop doorway because it was starting to rain and he did not want to get wet. We might further discover that John's girlfriend had earlier told him that she would not go out with him if he showed up for their date wet. Superficially, this could be regarded as a situational influence on John's behavior. However, it is more properly analyzed as part of the history of John's reason for acting: He did not want to get wet because of his knowledge of what his girlfriend had said to him. Thus, situational factors can form part of the history of an individual's reasons for action (Malle, 1999) . In addition, John might say that he jumped into the shop doorway because it was starting to rain. But this is not a situational cause of behavior either. It is in fact the belief component of John's reason for acting and therefore an internal, personal factor. It can be incorrectly identified as a situational cause because it is not explicitly marked as a belief (Malle, 1999) .
If we cannot say for certain what is a situational cause of behavior and what is not, or what role situational factors play in the production of behavior, then there is little prospect of discovering whether there is a causal asymmetry in attributions about social actions. There is strong evidence that people do make errors in both causal attribution and dispositional inference: That much is agreed upon by both advocates and critics of the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 2001; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Sabini et al., 2001a; Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001b) . But what is not agreed upon is whether these errors show a consistent tendency to overestimate the causal importance of the actor as a cause of his or her own behavior and to underestimate that of the situation. At present, therefore, there is not a strong case to be made for a causal asymmetry in the realm of social causality, that is, the kind of causality that is understood in terms of the meanings that behaviors have.
A Hypothesis About the Origin of the Causal Asymmetry
If the causal asymmetry is a feature of several distinct domains of causal understanding, how does it originate? On this matter I can only offer a brief conjecture. I have argued that the origins of causal understanding lie in actions upon objects haptically perceived (White, 1999) . In brief, the haptic system includes kinesthesis and skin pressure sensors. Whenever we act upon an object, the haptic system yields relatively direct information about the disposition in space and the motions of our bodies, as well as about the effects of our motions on the objects on which we act. When we wield a stick, for example, we directly experience our action and its effect on the stick. This is not a matter of accurately perceiving the properties of the stick, such as its length, but simply a matter of experiencing, through the haptic system, the effects of our actions on the stick.
I argued (White, 1999) that only this kind of interaction gives us direct experience of causality. In other sensory modalities, such as vision, the objects of perception are distal, and there can therefore be no claim to direct knowledge of causal relations involving them. The directness of our knowledge in the case of actions on objects haptically perceived is warranted by the fact that the motor and sensory equipment are anatomically located in the same place, namely, the extremities (Gibson, 1968; Michaels & Carello, 1981) .
We receive articular kinesthetic information relating directly to the muscular and skeletal involvement in the action, we receive skin pressure sensory information from the points of contact between the hand and the object, and there is continual coordination between the motor activity and the perceptual feedback.
This position is expounded on and argued at greater length in White (1999) . For the present purposes, the point of greatest relevance is that actions on objects haptically perceived have some general features that match those of the causal asymmetry. Therefore, if actions on objects haptically perceived are the origin of our causal understanding, these features of actions on objects haptically perceived could be the origin of the causal asymmetry. The feature that matters most is the distinction between active and passive motion. Our movements are active, in the specific sense that we ourselves make them happen. The motions of the objects we manipulate are, mostly, passive, in the sense that they are made to happen by our actions upon them. Of course we can be passive ourselves: As babies we have experiences of being lifted and carried by adults. But when we are passive, there is no coordination between the motor and sensory aspects of our actions, because we are not acting. That is, we experience motion, but we do not experience causation. The critical experiences for learning about causation are those in which we are active.
Newton's third law applies to actions on objects: The force exerted by the manipulated object on the actor is equal and opposite to that exerted by the actor on the object. Nonetheless, in actions on objects there is a characteristic direction to the redistribution of momentum between the objects. That is, we are usually successful in manipulating the object even if it takes a while to acquire real skill at it; the object does not manipulate us. The outcome, in terms of displacement of the object, is determined by our actions in spite of the object's inertia. This asymmetry, the characteristic distribution of momentum, may be sufficient to establish the causal asymmetry as a general feature of our understanding of causality.
Both versions of the causal asymmetry could arise in this way. Objects offer resistance, and we experience that resistance in acting on objects. But, to the extent that we tend to overcome that resistance and manipulate the object successfully, we will tend to regard the displacement of the object as brought about primarily by our own efforts and to downplay the causal contribution of the object's own properties. This is Version 1 of the causal asymmetry: We do not necessarily view the object as contributing nothing at all, but we do underestimate its contribution to the mechanics of the interaction. Of course, when we push an object, the force of the push is opposed not only by the reactive force of the object but also by resistive forces acting on the object in the opposite direction to the push, such as friction. (Imagine also two people pushing on a cup in opposite directions: The direction of motion of the cup depends on who pushes harder.) This is not a case of the causal asymmetry, but it could also play a role in the acquisition of the causal asymmetry and of causal understanding in general, because the resistive force of friction may be incorrectly interpreted as the reactive force of the object being pushed (diSessa, 1993) .
Version 2 of the causal asymmetry could arise from a different but related aspect of actions on objects. On most occasions, prior knowledge of relevant object properties enables us to plan active manipulations of those objects in ways that take their properties into account. This is automatic and unheeded and could therefore explain why we neglect the effect of the manipulated object on ourselves. Only when the object properties are unexpected do we become aware of this kind of effect. I remember a formative experience from childhood in which I failed, initially, to lift a beaker of mercury because I had no idea how heavy it was. When such experiences occur, we would give a greater estimate of the force of the effect object in the interaction. In fact, the mass of the effect object always contributes to the interaction, but usually we have no awareness of this fact because our movements are planned to take account of it automatically. This could be an important determinant of the causal asymmetry, particularly Version 2.
It might seem odd, almost paradoxical, to hypothesize that a pervasive bias in our understanding of causality has its origin in direct and veridical perception of a class of causal relations. But the bias originates not so much in our direct haptic perceptions as in the fact that we have a consistent point of view: We are always on the side of the agent, in the experiences that are critical for learning about causality, and the bias that is the causal asymmetry owes its origin to having this point of view.
As I have said, this can only be a conjecture at present. However, it is not entirely without supporting evidence. It is noteworthy that the leading authors in the main domains of inquiry reviewed here-phenomenal causality, naive physics, and force dynamics-all drew parallels between humans' understanding of physical causality and human actions. DiSessa (1993) commented that agency seems to lie at the root of intuitive physics. His definition of Ohm's p-prim expresses the asymmetry in terms of an agent-patient distinction, and he favored the application of Ohm's p-prim in some areas of social causality such as a parent attempting to overcome a child's resistance. In force dynamics, the roles of agonist versus antagonist (Talmy, 1988) and of affector versus patient (Wolff & Song, 2003) are conceptually related to an agent-patient distinction, and Wolff and Song (2003) in particular noted that many verbs of causality under the force dynamics analysis describe, either exclusively or usually, human actions. Michotte (1963) commented that the observers in his experiments "had an amazing tendency, in describing their impressions, to make comparisons with human or animal activity" (p. 280). He reported that one observer of a launching effect stimulus described it as follows: "A 'gave B a kick in the seat of the pants and sent him flying'" (p. 280). This is only circumstantial evidence. Even if causal understanding does originate in our own experience as agents, the haptic perception hypothesis is not the first hypothesis of this general kind (see Michotte, 1963 , for others). But we certainly have a privileged knowledge of our own actions and their effects on objects that we can never have of interactions between physical objects other than ourselves: Why should that privilege not count for something in learning about causality? It is also noteworthy that most of our knowledge of interactions that can be described by the laws of mechanics comes from interactions between ourselves and objects. We observe other material particulars interacting quite frequently: We see stones breaking windows, cats catching birds, hail bouncing off a concrete path. But we are involved in interactions with objects all the time, even when we are doing nothing more than sitting in a chair, and most of those interactions have the quality of making something happen (as opposed to making something remain as it is) that we associate with actions on objects. It does not seem unlikely that this vast quantity of direct experience has a formative influence on causal understanding in general and on the causal asymmetry in particular.
Discussion
I have argued that people tend to interpret classical two-body interactions by identifying one object as the cause object and the other as the effect object. They then tend to overestimate the strength or importance of the cause object and to underestimate or altogether neglect that of the effect object. They underestimate or neglect both the contribution of the effect object's properties to the change of state it undergoes in the interaction and the force exerted by the effect object on the cause object. I have called this the causal asymmetry. This is shown in the perceptual phenomenon of the launching effect and other forms of phenomenal causality; in reasoning about problems in physics, including the difficulty students have in learning Newton's third law; in the concepts that underlie linguistic expressions of causation; and in the methodology of research on causal judgment from contingency information. This evidence indicates that the causal asymmetry is a pervasive and perhaps fundamental feature of people'sunderstanding of physical causality. It is not clear whether it is also a feature of their understanding of social causality.
I have proposed that the causal asymmetry follows from the identification of one object as the cause object and the other as the effect object. Could it be the other way round, so that an asymmetry in force is initially perceived or judged to occur and the identifications of the cause object and the effect object follow from that? There are two arguments against this interpretation.
The positive argument is that there is evidence in some cases that objects are identified as causes or effects before the occurrence of the interaction and therefore before the causal asymmetry could occur. In diSessa's (1982) experiment with the Newtonian object, the participants themselves acted on the object. In that study, the identification of the cause object (the participant) and the effect object (the Newtonian object) was established by the experimental task and must therefore have been temporally prior to the causal asymmetry. I have already mentioned diSessa's (1993) comment that some students claim that one can tell which is the action and which is the reaction in naive physics tasks from which acts first, a clear use of activity to identify the causal object. Nonmoving objects are not seen as causes, either in naive physics or in force dynamics. For example, people do not tend to see a table as causing a cup that is resting on it to remain where it is (diSessa, 1993) . In the launching effect, the fact that Object A is in motion and Object B stationary before contact similarly establishes an expectation that A will be the cause object and B the effect object, again because nonmoving objects are not seen as causes: Even before contact it looks as though A will act on B, and it does not look as though B will act on A. Here too, the causal asymmetry does not occur until contact or after, so it must follow the identification of A as cause and B as effect.
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The negative argument is the lack of an alternative explanation for the occurrence of the causal asymmetry. In principle it would be possible to perceive Object A as exerting more force on Object B than Object B exerts on Object A without either having been identified as the cause object or the effect object. This could still be called an example of a causal asymmetry according to the standard set by Newton's third law. But how would this perception occur? One way is that it might arise from differences in the magnitude of the change of state: A could be perceived as exerting more force on B than B does on A because B undergoes a greater change of state than A does. But in the case of the launching effect, this is the opposite of what happens. A undergoes a greater change of state than B, and yet A is perceived as the cause of B's motion but B is not perceived as the cause of A's stopping. In this case, therefore, the difference in the magnitudes of the changes in state could not be responsible for the difference in the perceived force exerted. If we look at the typical launching effect stimulus, there is no other feature of the stimulus that could account for differences in the perception of force exerted. The stimulus, like other stimuli in phenomenal causality experiments, is deliberately simplified so that no changes other than kinematic ones occur. And, as I pointed out earlier, the typical stimuli for various forms of phenomenal causality have nothing in common except for the fact that the cause object is the one that moves first.
The most extreme argument that could be made is that no matter what the temporal order of things, identification of the cause object and the effect object is not involved in the causal asymmetry at all. There might simply be biases in perception of the forces exerted by objects on each other that can be attributed in part to observed differences in the magnitude of the change of state, in part to differences in perceived activity and passivity, and in part to other factors such as practical concerns. What makes this argument implausible is that identification of cause and effect objects is ubiquitous; it is, in fact, the very hallmark of causal understanding. We do not just perceive interactions between objects with different degrees of force being involved; we perceive causes acting to produce effects, with the cause residing in one body and the effect in another. Runeson (1983) would not have needed to argue against the concept of cause in Michotte's (1963) research if this were not the case. Interactions between objects are perceived, naively understood, and linguistically described not as interactions but as relations between doer and done-to. The causal asymmetry is therefore intimately connected with the ubiquitous tendency to see one party to an interaction as a cause object and the other as an effect object.
In light of this finding, it might be argued that the real causal asymmetry lies in the differentiation of objects into cause objects and effect objects. However, there are legitimate differences between causal analyses and Newtonian analyses. Newton's third law is concerned with what happens at contact. For example, in the case in which Car A collides with Car B, which was stationary, the laws apply to the instant of collision. (Strictly speaking, they apply to the moments immediately before and immediately after the instant of collision, but in any case they do not conflate interactions that happen at different times.) What matters, for predictive purposes, is the velocity of the cars at collision, not the velocity either of them had 10 s before the collision. In causal analysis one is, quite properly, concerned also with what was going on prior to contact. For example, what the driver of Car A did prior to contact is properly relevant to a causal analysis of the collision. Causal analysis therefore legitimately extends beyond the confines of a single two-body interaction. This is not to say that the laws of mechanics do not apply to events before the collision. Before the collision, Car A is in contact with the road, the driver is in contact with the car's controls, and the laws of mechanics apply to these interactions too. It is to say, instead, that the level at which people usually analyze causation tends to conflate multiple interactions between objects, often subsumed under a simple description (e.g., "Car A rammed Car B"). The assignment of causal roles, therefore, is not merely to the objects in a single two-body interaction, but quite possibly to elements of different interactions (e.g., Car A sliding on ice before contacting Car B) and even to nonevents (e.g., the driver of Car A failing to brake).
Furthermore, causal analysis is part of the process of giving meaning to events. The laws of mechanics are not concerned with meanings, but causal analyses are. The notion of a car, for example, is not just of a physical object but also of a social construction: It is defined in part in terms of its function and purpose. The behavior of the driver, such as not braking, is not merely a matter of motions but of meaning, such as being deliberate versus being accidental. These meanings are intimately involved in causal analyses. To the extent that this is true, causality is a social or psychological construct as much as a physical one. This is true of most of people's understanding of events. Persuasion, for example, is a kind of action that is understood almost entirely in terms of meanings that have psychological reference, and the actual physical motions involved in acts of persuasion play a comparatively minor role. This does not mean that persuasion is illusory or unreal: It is just a matter of being clear about the kind of reality it possesses. The same is true of causation. So one can agree with Runeson (1983) that the concept of cause is not represented in the 3 The expectation could be disconfirmed: A might be observed to rebound off B, which remains stationary. Perception of this kind of stimulus has not been researched, and it is not clear how it would be perceived. This kind of stimulus could not provide evidence relevant to the causal asymmetry, however, because there is a confound with the magnitude of the change in state: There is clearly a greater change in state for A than for B, because B undergoes no change in state at all. Thus, if B is perceived as the cause of A's change in state, the difference in the magnitudes of the changes in state could be the explanation for that. However, it is not certain that B would be perceived as the cause. It is not intuitively plausible to say that B caused A to rebound because, again, B did not do anything. It is more plausible to say that A rebounded because it hit the floor (see also Footnote 2). Perhaps the conflict between the activity criterion and the magnitude of the change in state cue is such that no clear identification of the cause object results, or the contact event is identified as the cause, rather than either of the objects. In any case, in the launching effect, where there is a known causal impression, the identification of the cause object and the effect object is accomplished before contact, and therefore before the causal asymmetry occurs. laws of mechanics, but that does not entail that causal analysis is not a legitimate occupation. It is just that once objects have been identified as the cause object and the effect object, people's perception of and reasoning about the events involved are thereby biased.
Is the causal asymmetry important, or is it merely a curiosity that has little effect on human life and society? There are several reasons for thinking that it may have an important impact on people's lives. The causal asymmetry matters, fundamentally, because people do not see the world as it is. When we interact with an object, or watch somebody else doing so, or see objects interacting with each other, we have an incorrect understanding of what is going on: We perceive these interactions incorrectly, we reason about them incorrectly, and we express them in language incorrectly. It seems that this incorrect understanding influences researchers' methods of investigating causal understanding and perhaps even the research questions they think worthy of addressing. It matters to the progress of science, and therefore to the impact that science has on the world in which we live, that errors and illusions in our understanding of reality should be exposed and corrected.
More specifically, people have an intuitive understanding of the laws of physics that is to some degree influenced by this pervasive bias in their perceptions. One implication of this bias, discussed at length by diSessa (1993) , is that education in physics is hampered by the inaccurate intuitive understanding that students bring with them into the classroom. In particular, students experience difficulty in reasoning about physical systems in accordance with the laws of mechanics. The causal asymmetry is particularly involved in the difficulty students have in appreciating the reciprocity of interactions between objects in simple physical systems. DiSessa (1993) described several examples of this.
Historically, the laws of mechanics were a relatively late development in physics and were an important contribution to the rise of classical physics and modern science in general (Debus, 1978; Dijksterhuis, 1961; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1962) . The reasons why the laws of mechanics were formulated when they were and not earlier are of course bound up with historical and cultural factors of considerable complexity, and it would be wrong to assign too much importance to any one factor. Nonetheless, the laws of mechanics are, as we have seen, counterintuitive and at odds with the view of the world enshrined in the causal asymmetry. If instead people naturally perceived events in accordance with the laws of mechanics, the laws themselves would have been more intuitive, and it is therefore likely that they could have been formulated considerably earlier than they were. This would have had profound repercussions for the development of scientific thought.
In addition, further important judgments often depend on judgments about causality. For example, in cases of accidents or torts, judgments of responsibility and blame depend to a considerable degree on judgments of causality (Lloyd-Bostock, 1983; Shaver, 1985) . If people's perception and interpretation of events such as car accidents are biased by the causal asymmetry, then there is likely to be a corresponding bias in consequent judgments of responsibility and blame, with further implications for insurance claims, legal action, and so on.
Is the causal asymmetry just an error, or is it in some way adaptive for humans to perceive and conceive of causal relations in this way? If my conjecture about the origins of the causal asymmetry is correct, then it could be dismissed as just an inevitable consequence of our consistent point of view on actions on objects, with no further functional significance. However, it is through our actions, primarily, that we exert control over things in the world. It is therefore possible that the causal asymmetry is a by-product of a practically advantageous directing of attention. We may achieve more effective control and manipulation of objects by focusing attention on our actions and their effects than by adopting a more accurate view of transfer of momentum in both directions. Indeed, some philosophers have argued that causality can be defined in terms of manipulation (Collingwood, 1940; von Wright, 1974) . Collingwood (1940) argued that the thing that will be identified as a cause is the thing that the judge can manipulate. This is likely to vary depending on the judge's role and capabilities. For example, in the case of a car accident, Collingwood argued that the county surveyor would be likely to identify a defect in the road as the cause because that is what he or she can manipulate, whereas the motor manufacturer would be more likely to identify a defect in the car, for the same reason. Collingwood even asserted that there is no point in carrying out a causal analysis unless there is some prospect of manipulating the thing identified as the cause. This emphasis on manipulability illustrates the practical utility of our understanding of causality. We identify causes in a way that aids us with our practical concerns (White, 1984) . The causal asymmetry, although erroneous, may be adaptive in the sense that it is useful from a practical point of view to see events in that way.
Is the causal asymmetry a universal feature of perception and cognition, or could it be susceptible to variation across times and cultures? It seems likely that the causal asymmetry in the perception of collision events is universal. Morris and Peng (1994) found no cross-cultural variation in the occurrence of the launching effect, so to the extent that the launching effect implicitly exemplifies the causal asymmetry, at this level the phenomenon may well be universal. Higher level causal cognition is characterized by consistent cultural differences (I. Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999) . The correspondence bias, the tendency to overestimate the extent to which behavior reflects underlying personal dispositions, has been found to be less prevalent in Eastern than in Western cultures (I. Choi et al., 1999) . However, as I argued earlier, it is far from clear that the correspondence bias or the fundamental attribution error really are examples of the causal asymmetry. There is no direct implication from a causal asymmetry in the perception of physical collision events to a correspondence bias in interpretations of the meaning of social behavior. It may be, therefore, that the causal asymmetry is a consistent feature of those aspects of perception and cognition that vary little or not at all across cultures. But it is not clear at present whether the causal asymmetry occurs at all at levels of cognition where cultural factors influence the interpretation and meaning of events.
Awareness of the causal asymmetry can lead to a reexamination of the assumptions and biases in theories of causal perception and judgment. Although causality is a useful and pragmatic construct, it is, nonetheless, a psychological construct rather than an objective feature of reality. Reflecting on the contrast between the causal asymmetry and objective Newtonian descriptions of interactions between objects can help to reveal the nature of this construct and could motivate novel approaches to theories of causal understanding.
The hypothesis of the causal asymmetry also generates numerous predictions for phenomena of causal perception and judgment. Many of these can be seen in the foregoing review of research, except that the causal asymmetry emerged from the research rather than being the actual object of it. For example, manipulating the activity versus the passivity of objects should have predictable effects on the identification of the cause object and the effect object and on attributions of force or strength to the objects involved. It should also have predictable effects on the ways in which observers describe the interactions, such as a tendency to say that A caused B to move rather than that B caused A to stop. Observers can make accurate judgments of dynamical properties such as mass (Runeson et al., 2000) , but despite this fact the evidence is that their perceptual impressions of causality are biased by the causal asymmetry. Comparisons between perceptions, judgments, and verbal descriptions of interactions and objective Newtonian descriptions of them can reveal much about the extent and nature of the bias.
In addition, it should be possible to manipulate the identification of objects as cause objects and effect objects, with predictable consequences for the occurrence of the causal asymmetry. Consider the launching effect. It is likely that observers visually attend to the moving parts of the typical launching stimulus: Object A before contact and Object B after contact. Attention might therefore be a factor mediating between activity and identifying the cause object: We tend to identify as the cause the factor that holds our attention (Taylor & Fiske, 1975) , and before contact, that factor is Object A. This can be manipulated: One could instruct participants to fixate Object B before contact and Object A after contact. This might facilitate a shift in causal identification, with the fixated Object B being seen as the cause object and Object A as the effect object. If this shift in identification occurs, then the causal asymmetry should also occur the other way round, with B judged to be the cause of A stopping and A's role being neglected or underestimated. It has already been demonstrated that the occurrence of the launching effect can be influenced by changing the focus of attention (Michotte, 1963; Scholl & Nakayama, 2004) , so it is not unlikely that manipulations of the focus of attention would have predictable effects on the causal asymmetry as well.
The causal asymmetry is not in itself a theory, but a hypothesis about a pervasive tendency in causal perception, judgment, and understanding. As such, it moves the field forward in at least three ways. First, as I have argued, it explicates what has until now been an implicit and unregarded assumption in theories of causal judgment. Second, the work of theorists and researchers can benefit from a greater awareness of the causal asymmetry as a phenomenon of their own thinking about causality as well as of participants' perceptions and judgments. Trying to understand collision events from a Newtonian perspective has been enlightening for me and will, I hope, be of benefit to my future work. Third, the causal asymmetry encourages researchers to focus on the comparison between participants' perceptions and judgments and the objective analyses provided by the laws of mechanics. The point of such comparisons is not so much to demonstrate error and bias in perception and judgment but to elucidate the content and nature of causal understanding.
I have proposed that the causal asymmetry is a general bias that can be found in diverse domains of causal cognition. It is not clear at present whether it applies in the domain of social causality, and it may be confined to situations in which the laws of mechanics apply. But the laws of mechanics apply all the time. At this moment I am sitting on a chair, pressing keys on a keyboard. At other moments I lift mugs of tea, walk across my office, turn over sheets of paper, and so forth. There is no situation, no moment in people's lives, in which the laws of mechanics do not apply. Potentially, therefore, the causal asymmetry is a pervasive feature of our understanding of reality. There is a need for research to ascertain whether the similarities in the phenomena in different domains do indeed point to a unitary phenomenon, whether the phenomenon has a single point of origin, whether and to what extent it influences higher levels of cognition such as processes involved in causal attribution for social behavior, and whether it is universal or susceptible to variation across cultures or historical periods.
